Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 1 Issues 1 and 2: Symposium: Natural
Law and Legal Reasoning

Article

1990

The Value of Life
Lewis A. Kornhauser
New York University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Legal History Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 209 (1990)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

THE VALUE OF LIFE1
LEwIS A. KORNHAUSER 2

In "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning," John Finnis contends, first,
that rationality does not dictate a unique resolution of a conflict among
incommensurable values though it may distinguish acceptable from unacceptable outcomes; second, that, in cases of first impression, the law
may resolve these conflicts as it pleases; but third, that, once a legal
decision has been rendered, consistency, or, to use Dworkin's term, integrity, requires that society adhere to its prior resolution of this conflict
between competing values. 3 This comment elaborates some of the constraints that this third requirement of consistency imposes on federal
health and safety regulation.
Many, if not most, regulations promulgated by federal agencies affect
the survival chances of many individuals. For many of these regulations,
Executive Order 12291 requires that the agency adopt the regulation
dictated by a cost-benefit analysis. 4 Thus, the grounds of choice apparently
require the agency to "value" life and then to weigh lives saved against
the monetary costs.
Commentators often condemn as inconsistent federal health and safety
policy because different agencies have imputed different values to lives
saved. This comment asks, in the context of cost-benefit analysis, what
consistency requires. How much variation, if any, in valuation of life is
justifiable? Inevitably, questions concerning the moral foundations of economic valuations of life will arise.
Section 1 presents some evidence of variation among agency and academic valuations of life. It also outlines three different approaches to
evaluation of health and safety projects. These approaches differ along
two dimensions: an approach may be wealth-based or preference-based
and it may be more or less "aggregated." The variation detailed at the
outset of section 1 is among aggregate, preference-based values of life.

Copyright 1990 Lewis A. Kornhauser.

Professor of Law, New York University. Richard Revesz commented on several
early drafts as did Lawrence Sager on the penultimate draft. Questions and
2

comments of participants at the Conference on "The Practical Aspects of Jurisprudential Thought: Allocating Risk and Suffering" and at a seminar at the
University of Miami Law School greatly clarified my thinking.
3 Finnis, "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning," at mss 20.
4 Exec. Order 12291 sections 2 (b) - (e), 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981). Section 3
(d) requires that the agency identify potential costs and benefits including those
"that cannot be quantified in monetary terms." Id. at 13194. If loss of life cannot
be quantified in monetary terms, the agency might perhaps choose among (or at
least order) policies on the basis of "lives saved". Section 4 will touch on some
issues presented by such a procedure.
Exec. Order 12498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985) also seeks to coordinate the
regulatory program of the United States.
In some statutory schemes, Congress explicitly proscribes choice on the basis
of cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1) (Supp. U.
1981). Even in these cases, however, observers generally acknowledge that such
an analysis occurs sub rosa.
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The subsequent discussion argues for the following claims. First, the
most justifiable, "economic" approach to the evaluation of health and
safety regulation is a highly disaggregated, preference-based one. Put
differently, the observed variation in the value of life can be explained
at least in part 5 and, further, should have no normative significance. The
value of life as usually calculated provides an inadequate and inappropriate summary statistic on which to make decisions concerning the prevention of risks to life.
Second, even the most acceptable of the commonly used preferencebased approaches has several counterintuitive policy implications, the
most dramatic of which are: (a) It favors the lives of the rich over the
lives of the poor; (b) it favors "acute" over "preventive" interventions; (c)
on plausible assumptions, it favors the aged over the young; and (d) it
will often recommend policies that do not maximize the number of lives
saved for a given expenditure. The wealth bias, and in part the age bias,
can be avoided by using "hypothetical" preferences normalized to some
wealth standard; section 3 suggests a simple, and implementable procedure, of normalization. Adjusting for wealth differences, however, does
not alter conclusions (b) or (d).
Discussion of each of the four biases has already appeared at one place
or another in the already extant and extensive literature on the problems
of valuing life, 6 though I am not aware of any prior suggestion of the
obvious means to eliminate wealth bias. Only the gravity of the issues
and the ease with which policy may err on this issue justify the rehearsal
of the topic and uniting these various strands of criticism.

1That is, economic theory itself predicts that the aggregate measures that the
agencies purport to use will impute different values to life in different contexts.
Theory, of course, may not explain the actual variation observed; such an explanation would require an examination of the actual procedures and data used by
the agencies, a study I have not undertaken.

6 The literature on valuing life is vast. Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing
Lives, 23 PUBLIC POLICY 419-64 (1975), provides a survey of some of the earlier
studies. Schelling, T.C., The Life You Save May Be Your Own, PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (S. Chase, Jr. ed. 1968), was an early advocate of
preference-based measures. Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1415-37
(1969), was, to my knowledge, the first to examine the different attitudes towards
identified and statistical lives.

Because many of the issues that arise in evaluating survival risks also arise

in other contexts, the general literature on cost-benefit analysis bears on the
discussion. A comprehensive introduction to cost-benefit analysis is MISHAN, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS

(1971). In the legal literature, much of the debate over cost-

benefit analysis has focussed on the offer/asking price problem, discussed briefly
infra at section 1.22. The policy implications of cost-benefit analysis that I em-

phasize do not depend on which measure one adopts. For discussion of this problem

see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981) and Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost Benefit Analysis and
the Determinationof Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169 (1986).
Also, I consider the choice of ex ante regulatory rules and not the problems of
ex post compensation presented by tort law. For a helpful discussion of this problem, see Arlen, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113 (1985).
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1. Some preliminaries.
1.1 The Range of Economic Estimates of the Value of Life.
1.11 The Variationin Agency Valuations of Life. Virtually every social
decision implicitly places a monetary value on a life, or more precisely,
on the reduction in the risk of loss of life. Regulations that establish
standards for safe consumer products, safe drugs, safe workplaces, ambient air quality, water quality, or highway safety do not insist that the
product cause no injuries, the drug no deaths, the workplace no accidents,
air and water pollution no disease. At some point the administrative
agency acknowledges that an additional reduction in the risk of death
does not warrant the additional cost. 7 From this we may calculate the
agency's implicit valuation of a life.
When we do so, we discover wide variation within and across agencies.
A 1981 study calculated the median value of a life used by several federal
agencies. These medians ranged from $50,000 by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and $64,000 by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Commission to $2.6 million by the EPA and $12.1 million dollars by
OSHA."
Another study calculated a range of $70,000 used by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") in 1980, in regulations concerning
space heaters, to $132 million used by the FDA in banning DES from
cattle feed.9 The variation in these valuations is staggering; the CPSC
and the FDA measures differ by a factor of roughly 2000, while, in the
prior study, OSHA imputed a value to life roughly 240 times greater than
that used by CPSC.
1.12 The Variation in Academic Valuations of Life.
The economic literature also contains numerous efforts to estimate the
value of life. These studies also exhibit a wide variation, though not as
wide as that found in agency practice.
One academic study determined that individuals who voluntarily accept high risks value their lives at $600,000 while involuntary and remote
risks are valued at $7,000,000.10
One commentator contends that the variations in these estimates reflects only the inability of individuals to discriminate among risks smaller
than .00 1. Consequently, the estimates for small risks r inflate the value
of life V estimated from larger risks by a factor (.001/r) yielding an excessive valuation V' = (.001V/r)."
I This cost may take many forms. Often the cost of reducing one risk to zero
will be to increase the dangers presented by another risk. One might reduce the
risk of asbestosis by banning asbestos but that action might increase the risk of
death from fires. At other times, eliminating a particular threat may raise monetary costs or other costs so as to require a dramatic change in the way of life of
a large portion of a community.
I Graham and Vaupel, The Value of a Life: What Difference Would It Make? 1
RISK ANALYSIS 89-95 (1981) cited in VALUES AT RISK 14 (D. Maclean ed. 1986).
Gillette and Hopkins, Adm. Conf. report citing OMB study.
10 Viscusi, The Valuation of Risks to Life and Health: Guidelines for Policy
Analysis in BENEFITS ASSESSMENT: THE STATE OF THE ART (J. Bentkover et al. eds.
(1986)).
11Mishan, Consistency in the Valuation of Life: A Wild Goose Chase? in ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS 152-167 (E. Paul, J. Paul, & F. Miller eds. 1985)).
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1.2 Measures of the Value of Life.
Economists have used several distinct methods for the evaluation of
projects that affect the survival prospects of some population. I shall
discuss three: (1) human capital, (2) "consumer preference" valuations of
specific risks,'12 and (3) valuations of life based on (2). A general consensus
has now emerged that the human capital approach is inferior to the other
two, preference-based methods of valuation.
1.21 The Human CapitalApproach. The human capital approach identifies the value of an individual's life with the expected discounted present
value of her future stream of earnings. In one sense, this approach measures lost income rather than lost life; it establishes a reasonable price
for the difficult-to-imagine contingency in which an individual loses all
opportunity to earn an income but otherwise remains healthy and immured in her social situation. 13 In another sense, the human capital measure "captures" the "social" value of the individual's life as it measures
14
her productive capacity.
Two features of the human capital measure might introduce some variation in the estimated value of life. First, the method discounts future
income with respect to both time and survival prospects. Thus, a 10%
reduction in the risk of death in year 1 increases human capital more
than a 10% reduction in the risk of death in year 2 (or any other later
year).15 Thus, the appropriate valuation of a life depends on the particular
project. Put differently, a cost-benefit comparison of various projects ought
not compare them on the basis of lives saved weighted by some independent value of life; rather, projects would be ranked in terms of the net
change in human capital.
Second, the value of life will vary from individual to individual because
different individuals face different streams of expected income. Expected
income might vary because the individuals face different survival prospects or because, though facing the same prospects of survival, they have
different employment and earnings prospects. Consider the latter case in
which each individual in a population of one thousand has different earning prospects. Suppose further that each individual in the group faces an
identical risk of death. The population now considers undertaking a proj,1 1 use "consumer preference" to designate the two "willingness-to-expend"
approaches called "willingness-to-pay" and "willingness-to-accept" (or, respectively, "compensating variation" and "equivalent variation"; or, again, "offer
price" and "asking price"). For a discussion of the distinction between these two
consumer preference approaches see text at notes 18 - 21 infra.

"3Even interpreted in this fashion, the approach ignores any value the individual may place on work itself or the status (or dignity) that being an income
earner affords in contemporary society.
14A variant on this approach explicitly identifies the value of the individual's
life with her net social product; thus it sets VNP = VHc - C where Vc is the value
of the individual's life measured in terms of her human capital and C is the
individual's consumption.
1In
general, the expected value of the future stream of income will depend
on the survival prospect 7r, in each year i; the human capital measure will thus
be a function of the vector (ir).
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ect that will reduce the risk of death to each of them by some small
amount. How ought the "society" value this project? On the human capital
approach, society ought to calculate the change in human capital to each
individual and then sum them. Alternatively, it might determine the
average human capital of the population and multiply by a thousand, the
population size. Generally, the "value of a life" has this statistical sense;
it summarizes some data specific to a given project proposed for an iden16
tified population.
1.22 Preference-Based,Project Specific Measures. Human capital measures of the value of life ignore the "consumer's" perspective; how much
an individual values her life will generally differ from the expected discounted present value of her future income. 17 Human capital therefore
seems to understate the value of a life just as the price of an ordinary
commodity understates its "value" or "willingness to pay" of the consumer. Welfare economics thus recommends that the evaluation of a project that reduces an individual's risk of death by rri include as a benefit
the individual's willingness to pay for such a reduction.
To understand the consumer preference approach, we may usefully
assume that people have preferences over triples (m,p,8) where m is the
individual's wealth, p the background risk, and 8 the change in risk facing
an individual.18 Our intuitions suggest that these preferences satisfy:
16The value of the summary statistic does not depend on the text's assumptions
that individuals face identical pre-project survival prospects and that the project
benefits each identically. For further discussion see section 2.2.
17The relation of the value of life measured as human capital and its value in
terms of willingness to pay (discussed below) has been much debated. On this
issue see Bergstrom, When is a Man's Life Worth More than his Human Capital?
in THE VALUE OF LIFE AND SAFETY 3 - 26 (1982) and Linnerooth, The Value of
Human: Life: A Review of the Models, 17 EcoN. INQUIRY 52 (1979).
If perfect capital markets exist, intuition suggests that the willingness-to-pay
measure should always exceed a measure based on the change in the individual's
human capital. Consider, for example, some capital good. i's willingness-to-pay
should equal the discounted present value of the stream of income associated
with that capital good. Suppose the owner of the capital good learns of some threat
to its continued operation; the owner's willingness-to-pay to avoid that threat
should equal the difference in the present value of the stream of income discounted
by the likelihood of the threat's realization. Now suppose that the capital good
also provides some consumption value to the owner. Then her willingness-to-pay
should exceed the discounted value of the stream of income. (Education may be
an example of this phenomenon.) When i's life is threatened, her income stream
is threatened as well; she should therefore be willing to pay at least the (discounted) value of the (human) capital good at which the threat is aimed.
18More commonly, economists assume that individuals have preferences that
can be represented by utility functions of the form U(7r,w) = ru(w) where r is
survival probability and w is wealth (and implicitly the "utility" of death is 0).
Sometimes U is understood as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The
text "breaks out" the change in risk for expository purposes only. If the preferences
in the text met the condition that for all m, p, 8, [p+ = p' 81'] implies [(m,p,b)
is indifferent to (m,p',6')] then the exposition in the text could be derived from
the standard model. Some models of individual choice such as prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky) will violate the above condition because an individual
may, in these models, exhibit a preference for the status quo or different attitudes
towards gains and losses.
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(1) (m,p,8) is preferred to (m,p',8) for p < p';
(2) (m,p,8) is preferred to (m,p,8') for 0 < 8 < 8';
(3) (m,p,8) is preferred to (m',p,8) for m > m'.
Suppose we can represent these preferences with a utility function
U(m,p,8) such that U(m,p,8) > U(m',p',8') if and only if (m,p,8) is preferred
to (m',p',8').
From this information about preferences, one may impute a monetary
value to the risks presented (or prevented) by any given project. At the
outset, one must distinguish two distinct methods of monetary valuation,
willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-accept, which correspond to the
assignment of an entitlement. To understand this point, consider a proposed project that promises to reduce by 8 each individual i's risk of death
(in a population of 1000 persons). Assume also that each i has wealth m
and "but-for" 8, the background risk is p. Normally, the risk 8 arises
because the activities of others expose the population to this risk. Each
i's evaluation of this risk in monetary terms may depend on how society
"assigns the entitlement" to the risk. If society believes that i has
a right
to be free of the risk 8, then the generator of the risk must buy the rights
of the population (including i) put at risk. Thus the risk generator must
pay to each person i exposed to the risk some sum at least as great as
wi., the willingness-to-accept, defined by
Ui(m,p,0) - U(m + wia,p,8).
The payment wi. would just induce i to accept the additional risk of death.
On the other hand, if i has no right to be free of this risk, then the
population at risk, including i, must "purchase" the risk reduction 8 from
the risk generator. Thus, each i will offer no more than wi, i's willingnessto-pay, defined by
Ui(m,p,6) = Ui(m-wip,p,0).
As i is "wealthier" when she owns the entitlement, one would expect that
for each individual wia > wip. From a social point of view, the benefits (or
costs) equal the sum of the benefits to each individual. Thus, one can
define the social willingness to pay and willingness-to-accept by
Wp = 1Wip < Lwia = Wa.

Four features of this procedure merit comment. First, both measures
of the costs and benefits are project-specific. A different project may offer
a different reduction in risk. If we consider two projects in sequence, the
order in which they are considered might matter because the first project,
if implemented, reduces the background risk p against which the second
project might be measured. Second, as each individual's valuation of a
risk on this method depends on her wealth, the social measure will vary
both with the total wealth in the population and with the distribution of
that wealth. Third, the dependence of the valuation on the individual
implies that the social valuation of the risk may depend on the population
threatened. For example, suppose society must place a hazardous waste
site either at X or at Y. Populations of identical size will be exposed to
an identical change in risk (from an identical baseline). The population
at X may differ systematically in its valuation of the risk from the pop-
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ulation at Y perhaps because the population at X is poorer than the
population at Y or perhaps because of different demographic characteristics of the population such as age. Finally, because WP < Wa, the assignment of entitlement may determine whether a project goes forward
or not.
1.23 "Aggregate" Values of Life. The values of life listed at the outset
of this section are generally calculated from these willingness-to-expend
valuations. The values of life calculated from these measures may easily
vary because, as noted above, Wp and Wa depend on the background risk,
the promised risk reduction, and characteristics of the population at risk.
An example will clarify the importance of this dependence. Suppose that
Eve would pay $50 to avoid a .00001 increase in the risk of death she
faces. Standard methodology calculates the value of life as $50/.00001 =
$5,000,000. The methodology thus assumes that Eve values every .00001
increase in risk identically, whether it is a change from .99999 to 1.0000
or a change from .00001 to .00002.19
This assumption of linearity is clearly false; individual valuations of
changes in risk will vary with the background risk that is modified.
Suppose the background risk is p and that society faces risks from two
different activities. The risk from activity 1 can be reduced to 7T and the
risk of activity 2 to r'. If Tr < Tr', we would expect that valuation of life
derived from activity 2 to exceed the valuation of life derived from activity
1 (and that more dollars would be spent to reduce the risk from activity
2 than to reduce it from activity 1).20
Those academic studies that estimate a value of life on the basis of
occupational data have adopted a willingness-to-accept measure of the
value of a risk. If two occupations A and B are identical except that
occupation A presents an additional risk of death 8, then employers must
21
offer workers a wage premium to induce them to accept the higher risk.

19The literature recognizes the oddity of this assumption and consequently
will identify the valuation as a collective valuation of the risk or how much money
the exposed group must receive to compensate for the exposure. This formulation
should make one more hesitant to transport the valuation of a given risk in a
specified group to the valuation of an "equal risk" in a different group but it
remains subject to the main criticism of the text that the valuation will be dependent on the background risk that individuals face.
10The argument runs as follows. Each individual will be willing to pay less to
reduce the risk at 7r an infinitesimal amount than she would pay to make the
same infinitesimal reduction from 7r'. Thus, the valuation of the risk of activity
1 will attribute a lower value of life than that calculated from the risk reduction
for activity 2.
21 Empirical studies have generally relied on one of two techniques to measure
actual willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept. The text refers to a hedonic
price method that infers the valuation individuals place on life from data on
occupational risks and wages. This method regards each occupation as a complex
of characteristics such as, for example, risk of death, quality of working conditions,
flexibility in hours, and prestige. The method then attempts to determine how
the market values the underlying characteristics from the differing values placed

on occupations. For a general review, see, e.g., Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 339 (1979).
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2. Choosing among Measures.
The previous section offered three distinct methods of evaluation of
public projects that altered the survival prospects of the population. These
methods differed along two dimensions. First, the human capital approach
sought to maximize wealth while the other approaches strove to maximize
welfare. Second, the approaches differed in their level of aggregation.
Each method begins by calculating for each individual within the relevant
population some measure of the survival benefits of a proposed project.
Two different aggregative steps may then be made: one might calculate
a project-specific summary statistic (such as W.) or one might employ a
measure that applies across projects. 22 The "value-of-life" approach takes
both steps. It apparently purports to identify a value of life that applies
to each individual and across all projects. The willingness-to-pay (and
willingness-to-accept) approaches take only the first step; they compare
projects before a given population at a given time on the basis of a summary statistic, Wi. The least aggregative approach would compare projects
on the basis2 of the distribution of the individual valuations calculated at

the outset.

3

In this section, I shall first argue briefly that the appeal of wealth
measures derives from an assumed, but weak, connection to consumer
The contingent valuation method asks a sample population a set of hypothetical
questions concerning their willingnesses-to-pay or -to-accept. Hanley, Valuing
Non-Market Goods Using Contingent Valuation, 3 J. ECON. SURVEYS 235-252

(1989) provides a survey of some difficulties inherent in this method.

Two difficulties of the hedonic price method bear mention. First, different
members of the population may value the risk differently. Suppose we ordered
these from the lowest to the highest valuation. Estimation by wage differential

takes the valuation of the marginal worker, the wage necessary to attract the
last worker desired by the firm to the risk. All other workers in the risky industry

place no higher value on the risk and no non-worker in the industry places as
low a value on the risk. The valuation of the marginal worker may be appropriate
for "voluntary" risks such as those at issue in labor markets but it hardly seems
appropriate for "involuntary" risks to which some population may be subjected
by the "tortious" actions of a third party.
Second, workers may differ in their initial wealths and their initial background
risks as well as in their underlying preferences. Any estimation technique assumes a specific functional relation among these variations in wealth, background
risk, and the additional risks posed by the various occupations. The assumed
relation is often linear but the actual relation, it was argued earlier, is non-linear.
22The labelling is somewhat deceptive here. The aggregation is not strictly by
project but by "opportunity" where an opportunity is defined by the population

profile of initial wealths and survival prospects (m.,pi). Society must now choose
among various changes to this initial state. These changes might be defined by
the vector (6i) of changes in survival prospects of each person and C, the cost of

the program.
As the discussion in this paragraph suggests, section 1 did not offer an
exhaustive range of valuation methods. The human capital approach is amenable
to implementation at each of the three levels of aggregation suggested and implicitly illustrated by the consumer preference model.
The text does not consider a fourth method in which society takes the second
but not the first aggregative step. That is, one might attribute to each individual
a value of life that was independent of the project under consideration but then
fail to aggregate across individuals.
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preference. I shall then investigate the appeal of each aggregative step;
this inquiry shall itself question the legitimacy of the willingness-toexpend measures.
2.1 Criteriaof Choice among Measures.
Two distinct concerns animate the selection of a measure: ethical desirability and implementation. As the subsequent discussion will suggest,
the ethical appeal of "consumer preference" methods of evaluation rests
on the commonplace that government should adopt programs that improve the welfare of its citizens. This commonplace, however, may have
two distinct analytic foundations: welfare and consent. Individual welfare
might be important per se, regardless of the attitudes of the individuals
themselves. Alternatively, the justification for government promotion of
individual welfare might be consent; health and safety regulations should
24
mandate those programs that the citizenry itself would adopt. Welfare
and consent justifications run together because we often infer an individual's consent to an action from the observation that the action promotes
her welfare.
Administrative agencies, however, are not philosophy departments;
they must promulgate rules and regulations in a finite amount of time.
This practical consideration pushes a policymaker towards simpler procedures and aggregate measures for two reasons. In some instances, the
aggregate measure may be more easily determined than the full range
of individual evaluations. More importantly, aggregation facilitates delegation or decentralization. Social preferences that depend only on the
aggregate measure will be more simply communicated to the party that
actually decides. Similarly, society may have greater faith that its delegates will conform to straightforward sets of instructions than to complex
ones. When the aggregation occurs across projects as well as across individuals, the measure serves to "coordinate" the decisions of different
policymakers.
Ease of implementation rather than any ethical attribute recommends
the human capital method of evaluation of life. The fundamental assumption of welfare economics asserts that social choice should depend
(only) on the welfare of those within the society. The human capital
method relies not on welfare but on wealth. Individual welfare may (in
general) increase with wealth but wealth serves at best as a poor proxy
for welfare.
Roughly ten years ago, Richard Posner argued, first on
2 6
consequentialist 25 and then on consensual grounds, that policymakers
24 This criterion, "what the citizenry would adopt", is not obviously equivalent
to consent. Consent suggests unanimity while adoption might occur on the basis
of majority rule (or willingness to expend). Criteria of adoption weaker than
unanimity, however, are often justified by "upping the ex ante." The weaker criterion of adoption is itself justified by assuming that, under suitable conditions
of uncertainty, the population would have unanimously consented to the given
procedure.
Posner, Utilitarianisms,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979).
26
Posner, The Ethicaland PoliticalBasis of the The Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488 (1980).
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ought to choose those legal rules that maximize wealth. That claim stirred
a tempest greater than the merits of the claim warranted 27 and I shall
not rehearse the arguments made then. Throughout the rest of section
2, I shall assume that the evaluation method employs consumer preference.

28

2.2 Aggregation Across Individuals.
Consider a society of one thousand equally wealthy individuals, each
of whom faces identical survival prospects. Society must now decide
whether to pursue (at a known cost C) a specific project A that will increase
each individual's survival prospects equally. Take an aggregate measure
W of "consumer" preference for this project.29 At first glance, W is a useful
statistic for a decisionmaker. If W, the willingness-to-expend, is less than
the cost C of the program, the policymaker has reason to forego the project.
Or, if the policymaker faces a choice among several projects k with different costs Ck, different (uniform) changes 8 k in survival prospects, and
consequently different willingnesses-to-expend Wk, then the criterion
which choose that project with the highest ratio Wk/Ck of benefits to costs
is one that the population itself might have chosen to govern their choice.
The argument from consent, however, is flawed. In this context, an
argument from consent has an initial plausibility because individuals
receive equal benefits and begin materially equal (where "material" refers
to both wealth and survival prospects). The gap in the argument corresponds to the gap in the description of the policy; I have not stated how
the cost Ck will be allocated among the individuals. Given the equal

27 See generally, Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
REV. 485 (1980).

HOFSTRA

L.

28I do not address two more fundamental and perplexing issues. First, I take
the relevant population as given. Any account of social policy based on individual
preferences must identify whose preferences count. Each specific policy identifies

two potentially distinct sets of individuals as candidates for the relevant population: (a) those individuals whose survival risks are altered by the policy and
(b) those individuals who pay for or otherwise bear the economic costs of implementation. Current social policy practice does not necessarily adopt either of these
two populations. Many policies concerning air quality, for example, impose risks
on individuals outside the borders of the United States and social policy may not
consider the risks imposed on these individuals. Similarly, many policies affect
survival risks only locally though the costs are spread more widely.
Second, I do not defend the fundamental proposition that social policy should
be grounded solely on individual preferences. This proposition has been attacked;
indeed some of the arguments in later sections, especially section 5 infra suggest
that straightforward reliance on individual preferences will result in adoption of
undesirable policies.
Finally, I ignore a third complication. In most instances, a given policy affects
not only survival risks (or mortality rates) but also morbidity rates. Much of the
discussion of mortality should carry over with little alteration to morbidity but
I have not pursued those instances where deviations in the analysis might occur.
Section 4.1 infra touches on this issue glancingly.
That is, society uses either willingness-to-pay W, or willingness-to-accept
W,. Note that on the assumptions thus far, individuals only differ in their preferences; that is, if we randomly choose two individuals i and j from the population,
their preferences wi and wj may differ.
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material circumstances of the actors, many readers implicitly assume
that the cost will be shared equally. But an equal allocation of costs
implies an unequal distribution of net benefits (wi - ci). Those persons
reasonably indifferent to the reduction 8 will have low net benefits relative to those who care greatly about 8. Note that, under an equal cost
allocation, some individuals may actually suffer a loss in net welfare.
Such individuals, of course, should not be assumed to consent to the
project.30
One can attempt to resurrect the consent argument with the contention
that the population would have consented to the consumer preference
criterion of choice. The argument for consent here, however, assumes
that, at the time the population adopts the cost-benefit criterion, each
individual thinks herself equally likely to profit highly from project evaluation under the criterion.
The hypothetical just discussed provides the most favorable context for
use of a summary statistic on consumer preference to choose among projects. The case for use of a summary statistic is shaky even there, resting
either on the inherent value of welfare maximization or on a somewhat
dubious consent argument. Nonetheless, a brief examination of the use
of a summary statistic in more realistic contexts has some interest.
Suppose that individuals differ in their wealths but that they still face
identical pre-project survival prospects and that society considers only
uniform projects. The aggregate measure W retains its prior attractiveness though society may perhaps now have to attend more to the method
of cost allocation. Indeed, two hypotheticals reveal that the two uniformity
assumptions on risk have the same consensual force as the uniform wealth
assumption.
(1) Assume as before that each individual faces identical pre-project
survival prospects. The group must choose between two projects. Project
A benefits each individual identically; suppose the mean "consumer preference" for A is WA. Project B will be more beneficial to an identified
group of 700 and less beneficial to an identified group of 300; its mean
consumer preference is WB. The fact (WB > WA) seems no longer sufficient
to choose project B over project A. The argument from consent encounters
the same difficulty faced earlier. Some people prefer project A to B because
A offers them greater benefits. Of course, as long as project B offers each
person some (net) benefit, then each person has some reason to accept B
rather than A and hence might be said to consent to B. If, however, some
of those 300 individuals suffer net losses from B, they have no reason to
consent to it.
(2) Assume now that individuals differ in their pre-project survival
prospects. Society again considers projects A and B from before with the
smaller group of 300 consisting of those with the most favorable preproject survival prospects. Now the fact (WB < WA) seems no longer suf-

30This argument parallels traditional arguments in public finance. One should
not be surprised that the consent to a given pattern of benefits will depend on
the incidence of costs borne to achieve those benefits.
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ficient to choose project A over project B. This hypothetical case suggests
that society may care about the distribution of post-project survival prospects. Project A yields greater welfare measured in terms of willingnessto-expend but exacerbates pre-existing differences in survival prospects.
Society may find this effect unacceptable, particularly if the pre-existing
differences are correlated with wealth or race.
2.3 Aggregation across Projects.

The variation in the values of life used by various federal agencies has
prompted much criticism. Implicitly, critics advocate that all projects (or
project opportunities) employ a uniform value of a "statistical" life. As
consumer preference methods of evaluation of risks depend on both the
background risk and the extent of the proposed change, such uniformity
seems inconsistent with a consumer preference methodology of evaluation.
Two distinct motivations might underlie this drive for uniformity. First,
it might be understood as necessary to maximize the number of lives
saved. This objective will be discussed at length in section 4. Alternatively, uniformity might be justified as a coordination device1 Ideally,
society would evaluate all health and safety programs together. It would
rank them in order of desirability and then implement them in that order
as funds became available. Under current policy, however, different agencies have responsibility for different types of risk. EPA concerns itself
with air, water, and ground pollution; FDA regulates the quality of food
and drugs; OSHA oversees workplace hazards; and so on. Does this diversity of decision makers require uniform valuation of risks to life to
coordinate decisions?
The prior discussion suggests that use of a uniform value of life within
an agency will be undesirable. 32 Intra-agency coordination would be better done administratively than through "pricing" life.3 3 On the other hand,
it is not clear what decisions across agencies a uniform price will coordinate. Full coordination would require the re-allocation of funds from
one agency to another. Put differently, knowledge of the value of life used
in the "marginal" decision of each agency might assist Congress when it
determines agency budgets and when it evaluates agency performance.

31For example, coordination apparently motivates Usher, The Value of Life for
Decision Making in the Public Sector in ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 168-191 (E. Paul,

J. Paul, & F. Miller ed. 1985).
32Of course, each agency should use a uniformly correct procedure for evaluating projects. As outlined so far, such a procedure will depend on the distribution
of individual willingnesses-to-expend.
Some statutory schemes prevent an agency from evaluating all projects within
its purview against the same standard. The EPA, for example, is required by
Executive Order 12291 to apply cost-benefit analysis to regulations governing
water quality but the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1) (Supp. U. 1981)
proscribes consideration of economic costs.
13 Unless, of course, administrative reasons argue for intra-agency
divisions of
authority that remain autonomous.
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3. The Wealth Bias in Preference-BasedMeasures.
Willingness-to-expend measures of the value of life deny (and the directive "maximize number of lives saved" accepts) two appealing criteria
for social policy concerning survival risks: (1) the social valuation of a
risk should depend only on the number, but not the identity, of those
threatened; and (2) equal changes in risk should be valued equally (linearity).
Willingness-to-expend measures may violate the first criterion for two
distinct reasons. As already noted, individuals with identical preferences
but different wealth will value a specified risk differently. Equalizing
wealth, or constructing an equal-wealth measure, corrects for this variation but the improved measure will not eliminate variations caused by
differing preferences. Section 3.1 indicates how this bias arises and suggests a method of wealth-adjustment; section 3.2 asks whether, after
adjustment for wealth, remaining variations in preference present problems for preference-based measures.
The second criterion imposes a condition on social preferences towards
risk that runs counter to actual individual preferences. Individuals simply
do not value identically all policies that yield an identical reduction in
survival prospects. This aspect of individual preferences results in the
bias towards acute interventions; conversely, this bias argues that this
feature of individual preferences is not socially rational. Section 4 discusses some of these issues in the context of maximization of the number
of lives saved. Section 6, however, raises the possibility that individual
(and hence, on a willingness to expend approach, social) preferences might
depend on features of the risk.
3.1 The Nature of the Bias.
The discussion in section 2.2 suggested that inequalities of wealth may
undermine the attractiveness of an aggregate consumer preference
method of evaluation because the inequality in wealth may decrease the
likelihood that each individual receives positive net benefits. Inequality
of wealth, however, presents another difficulty that also bears attention.
As already noted, willingness-to-expend depends on an individual's
initial wealth. Suppose one believes, quite plausibly, that an individual's
34
with income.
preference for survival is income-elastic, i.e. "increases"
Then any consumer preference approach will weight changes in survival
prospects of the wealthy more heavily than changes in survival prospects
of the poor. Such a bias may be socially unacceptable; if so, one might
consider use of hypothetical consumer preferences based on some "acceptable" level of wealth.
Two baseline measures of wealth suggest themselves: the population
median and the population mean. Choice of the population mean, or
34Consider

some individual. Now consider some willingness to expend measure,

say w. at two different levels of wealth m and m' with m > m'. One may write,
for some background risk p and change 6, U(m,p,O) = U(m +w(m),p,b)

and

) implies w(m) > w(m').
w(m'),p,
= U(m'
U(mp,)
m > m'
pair +(p,8),
for every
Income elasticity means that,
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average wealth in the population, establishes a baseline based crudely
on the social ability to pay. Choice of the population median, a level of
wealth which exactly half the population exceeds, establishes, on reasonable assumptions, a baseline that reflects the wealth of the "average"
5
person in society.3
Having chosen a baseline, the actual population with wealths near that
baseline should provide a reasonable sample of the preferences of an entire
population with that wealth.3 6 The sample will provide an unbiased estimate as long as which set of preferences an individual has is uncorrelated with her wealth. An example of preferences that violate the
condition of no cor-relation may clarify the concept. Consider the preferences of two individuals, say St. Francis of Assisi who shuns wealth
and Donald Trump who revels in it. St. Francis is, because of his preferences, apt to be poor and Donald Trump, because of his preferences, is
apt to be rich; consequently, the use of the preferences of those with the
actual median wealth will not be an unbiased estimate of the population
preferences (on the assumption that St. Francis and Trump also differ
systematically in their attitudes towards risk of death).
3.2 Wealth-adjusted,Preference-based Measures.
Several potential problems may plague even a wealth-adjusted preference-based measure of risks to life. To evaluate these problems I shall
assume that everyone in the relevant population has equal wealth. Individuals may favor different social policies, however, for one of two reasons: they may have different preferences towards risk; or social policy
may affect their risks differently. Moreover, preferences towards risk may
vary systematically or unsystematically with some other demographic
characteristic.
Before addressing these three contingencies, I note a distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" risks.
3.21 Voluntary Risks Characterized.An individual, through her own
acts, may avoid exposure to some risks entirely; exposure to other risks
may be completely beyond the individual's unilateral actions. Scaling
8000 meter peaks without oxygen presents risks that all but a few individuals avoid without regret. Individuals born with cystic fibrosis, a
congenital disease, face a reduced life expectancy, regardless of their
individual choices.3 7 Most risks fall somewhere between these two extremes.
Product safety risks and occupational health and safety risks fall towards the voluntary end of the spectrum. Markets will often offer similar
products that vary in risk;38 presumably, safer product variants cost more
35 Distributions of wealth skew to the high end. Thus, the mean will in general
exceed the median. If the wealth distribution remains unequal, it seems somewhat
odd to base the decision on the preferences of a relatively "elite" group of individuals.

16One might have to adjust for underrepresentation of some demographic
groups, such as blacks and women, with disproportionately low wealths.
17 Of course, first their parents and then they may adopt courses of action that
improve or reduce their life chances conditional on the congenital defect.
8 Of course, regulation may limit the ability of markets to offer highly risky
product variants.
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money. Alternatively, the service provided by the product may be understood as a luxury, or "unnecessary" so that the choice to consume the
product is understood to include a choice to bear the associated risk. No
one, for example, must ski; risks of ski injuries are therefore seen as
voluntarily faced. Similarly, each occupation has a variety of characteristics including risks of death. A sufficiently rich range of available occupations includes, for any given risk of death, a set of occupations that
varies broadly in other dimensions such as working conditions, challenge
and prestige. Under these circumstances, higher wages will compensate
for the higher risks associated with some occupations. The choice of occupation therefore includes a choice of risk.
Inequality of wealth, which this section has assumed away, complicates
these assessments of voluntariness. An individual with many dependents
and little "wealth" (including few marketable skills) may "willingly"
undertake a risky occupation to support her family. Under these circumstances, her choice has a less voluntary air. On the other hand, this
individual would, under these circumstances, hardly favor elimination of
9
the risk as it would reduce her wage. When wealth is equally distributed,3
moreover, the choice of the high-risk, better paid occupation may simply
reflect a taste for greater consumption.
Given the prior discussion, one may ask, why regulate voluntary risks?
Several answers suggest themselves. First, individuals may not accurately perceive the risks to which they are subject. If some risks are
underestimated, the market will underprice them and individuals will
face more risk than they would, if perfectly informed, choose. Second, the
market may fail to offer adequate variation in product risk or occupational
risk. Third, individuals might not see the full social cost of their choices
of risk. A head of household may accept greater risks knowing that, upon
her death, society must support her dependents. Fourth, certain insurance
markets for risks may not form because of moral hazard or adverse selection.
Risks from air and water pollution seem somewhat less voluntary than
occupational risks. Of course, these risks may be mitigated by individual
actions. One may live in more or less polluted environments. But air and
water quality have a higher degree ofjoint consumption than occupational
degradation is
(or product) risk and the general extent of environmental
40
clearly outside the control of any single individual.
3.22 Non-systematic, Non-wealth Variationsin Preferences.Consider a
society in which all individuals face identical risks of death. They must
choose among policies that will result in identical reductions in risks to
each individual though different policies reduce different risks. If every39The example suggests the complexity of the idea of equal distribution of
wealth. To render her circumstances "non-coercive" may require that the individual's "equal" wealth reflect the greater number of dependents she has. On the
other hand family size is chosen by the parties and this voluntary element may
argue against adjusting wealth for family size.
40In addition, we may believe that individuals should not have to face certain
choices.
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one had identical preferences then they would rank policies identically;
social choice would present no conflicts. Suppose, however, that individuals do vary in their preferences. Ought social choice to be determined
by willingness-to-expend?
For purely voluntary risks, allocation of risk on the basis of willingness
to expend seems unobjectionable, even if some regulatory intervention is
justified. Suppose, for example, that society introduces a health insurance
scheme because adverse selection causes failure in the insurance market.
That scheme might specify the set of procedures that will be reimbursed.
On what basis could one object to another purchasing on the market a
non-reimbursable expenditure? If wealth were unequal, then an objection
grounded in the inequality of wealth might lie;41 otherwise one might
object only if the individual expenditures adversely affected the provision
of reimbursable procedures.
Consider now an involuntary risk. Specifically, suppose that society
must choose between two air quality standards H and L where standard
L imposes greater risks on each member of the population than standard
H. Let W be the aggregate willingness-to-accept the increased risks of
death created by a reduction in air quality from the standard H to the
standard L. Recall that W equals the monetary amount necessary to
purchase from each member of the threatened population the right to
impose the increased risk created by the change standard. To economists,
W is attractive because of its incentive properties; unless those who benefit from the reduction in standard see the full cost of the degradation in
air quality, they will choose to pollute too much. W, the price the population would accept to suffer the lower quality air,42 equals the lowest
monetary sum necessary to purchase all rights degraded by the lower air
quality. If W exceeds the difference in costs between the standards H and
L, economists would generally argue that H should be imposed. 4"
If compensation is not in fact paid to the threatened population, one
might argue that society ought not to look to the aggregate willingnessto-accept but to some higher number. Use of willingness-to-accept as the
measure indicates that society has assigned the right to be free of the

involuntary risk to the threatened population. Use of W as the aggregate
measure values each individual's right at the mean valuation; thus some
individuals will place a much higher price on exposure to the threatened

41 Of course, much of the controversy over health
policy stems from the inequality of wealth. Objections to rationing care to the poor rest in large part on
the discrepancy in access of rich and poor. Remedies other than wealth redistribution are difficult to imagine. Equal access in the presence of inequality requires
either availability of every procedure to all, an extremely costly policy, or the
prohibition of large numbers of treatments, a policy that seems unenforceable
given experience with illegal drugs and abortions prior to 1973.
42 1 ignore here considerations of future generations whose
preferences are
unlikely to be captured in W. (They might be captured in two ways: (1) intergenerational altruism on the part of the current generation or (2) some process,
adopted by the policymaker, of imputing preferences to future generations.)
4 Caveats to this argument were discussed above in section 2.2.
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risk (perhaps because exposure threatens them with greater harm). In
the absence of compensation, one might recognize the importance of the
rights of individuals who
right by imposing a standard that protects the
44
average.
than
highly
more
quality
air
value
3.23 Systematic, Non-Wealth Variations in Preferences. The model explicitly assumes that preferences over survival prospects vary with wealth
but preferences might also vary systematically with some other demographic characteristic such as age, race, gender, or marital status. Social
attitudes towards such variation may depend on its cause. I shall consider
two causes of systematic variation: correlation with wealth and correlation with attitudes towards or beliefs about risk. I shall use age as an
example.
45
Preferences may differ across age groups for several reasons. First,
of
stream
wealth may differ by age. Though the elderly have a shorter
wealth.
material
accumulated
greater
earnings ahead of them, they have
Moreover, the more heavily individuals discount future earnings, new
entrants into the labor force will be poorer relative to those further up
on a career ladder. Second, attitudes towards risk may differ with age.
The young are generally (though perhaps erroneously) assumed to be
more risk-loving than the elderly. If so, the young, other things being
equal, might pay less to avoid a given risk. Alternatively, perceptions of
risk might vary systematically with age. The young may underestimate
survival risks (or overestimate the background survival prospects) while
the old may overestimate the risks (and underestimate the background
prospects). With these perceptual biases, the young would once again be
less willing to pay to avoid a given risk.
3.24 Variations in Policy Effects. Most regulatory policies impose a
standard that has different effects on different individuals. Thus, choosing
a low air quality standard L over a high standard H poses a greater threat
to individuals with congenital lung problems or other sensitivity to specific pollutants. Use of an aggregate measure here presents problems
similar to those encountered when aggregate measures are used to evaluate identical risks faced by individuals whose wealth varies.
4. Maximizing the Number of Lives Saved.
"Pricing" life naturally arises in two contexts. Most of the prior discussion applies to the broad context in which lives may buy less fundamental goods such as convenience. The decision to build a highway that
does not reduce the risk of fatal accidents to as low as point as possible
sacrifices some statistical lives for the more mundane benefits that the
" On the other hand, imposing more stringent standards may impose additional costs on individuals who value air quality less.
45Program benefits might also vary systematically with age (or other demographic characteristics) and the nature of the risk. Suppose some invariably fatal
disease threatens an entire population. Each person has an equal chance of contracting the disease. At some cost, the society can develop, produce, and distribute
a perfectly safe and effective vaccine. Presumably, those with the longest life
expectancies will benefit most from this vaccine and hence be willing to pay the
most for it. This issue is discussed at greater length in section 3.1.
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cost savings may supply. Often, however, society must allocate a given
sum among various life-saving projects. Here, the price of one life is
measured in other lives. It seems reasonable to require that society maximize the number of lives it saves with the given fund. In this section, I
suggest first, that giving content to this mandate presents difficulties
and, second, that preference-based approaches to the evaluation of risk
do not imply that society will in fact maximize the number of lives saved.
4.1 Are All Lives Equal?
Suppose society unexpectedly finds $1 billion dollars to spend on lifesaving activities. How should it allocate these funds among competing
risks? In this context, society confronts a choice between lives rather than
a choice between lives and money. Why should society not simply maximize the number of lives it can save? After all, maximization of the
number of lives saved is apparently one way to treat all lives as equally
valuable. 46
At least two factors contradict this simple social rule. First, a "saved
life" is not unambiguously defined. How much longer must an individual
live for her life to have been saved? Some medical treatments may prolong
an individual's life by hours or days while others may prolong an individual's life by years or decades. Suppose we identify the provision of
some additional life expectancy, say one year as a "saved life." 47 Society
must still choose between one policy that extends the lives of many by a
single year and one that extends the lives of fewer individuals by twenty
years.
Second, not all saved lives are of equal quality. One policy might save
many lives from some disease but the side effects of the cure might be
debilitating in such ways that those saved must lead more restricted lives
than those they led prior to their illness. Another policy, in contrast,
might save fewer lives, but those lives saved may have fewer restrictions.
Some authors have suggested that society choose among these conflicting concerns on the basis of individual preferences. These preferences
might be extracted by asking individuals to scale various alternatives.48

- Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?" 6 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 293 (1977)
argues to the contrary that, in certain contexts at least, maximizing the number
of lives saved does not treat each individual with equal concern and respect. He
considers examples in which an individual must choose between saving identified
lives.
41 We might determine this cutoff life expectancy by reference
to the ability of
the individual to formulate plans or substantially to achieve some goal.
41Zeckhauser and Shepard, construct a scale of "QALY's"-"quality-adjusted
life-years", analagously to the von Neumann-Morgenstern procedure for constructing a scale of "risk-adjusted rewards." Zeckhauser and Shepard, Where Now
for Saving Lives? 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 11 (Autumn 1976),
Alternatively, one might ask how much an individual would pay (or accept)
to avoid (or suffer) various diminutions in the length and quality of her life. This
method probably is more sensitive to various differences among individuals such
as wealth and age than "QALY".
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4.2 Identified vs. StatisticalLives.
The prior exposition of the preference structure that underlies the calculation of the asking prices and offer prices in cost-benefit analysis already implies a phenomenon first identified by Charles Fried: individuals
treat the loss of identified lives differently from the loss of statistical
lives. 49 This different treatment implies that cost-benefit analysis recommends that society not maximize the number of lives saved.
A simple example illustrates this claim. Suppose society has $1,000,000
to reduce one of two risks. In situation A, the expenditure will reduce
the risk of death to each of 1000 individuals from .25 to .24. Each of these
individuals would pay $5000 to avoid this risk. In situation B, the same
expenditure will reduce the risk of death to each of 1500 individuals from
.05 to .04. Each of these individuals would pay $3000 to avoid this risk.
The willingness-to-pay criterion recommends reducing risk A as those
1000 people would pay $5 million to avoid the risk while those confronting
risk B would pay only $4.5 million to avoid risk B. Maximization of lives
saved, on the other hand, recommends reduction of risk B, which saves
15 lives against the 10 lives saved from the reduction of risk A.
5. The Bias towards "Acute" Care.
The choice between preventive and acute care is often understood as
exhibiting this phenomenon of favoring identified lives. But this conflict
may also reflect a different phenomenon: the inability of society to commit
itself to a policy that allows some to die when a treatment is available.
Suppose there are 1,000,000 people and each faces a .001 risk of contacting
a fatal illness. The population then expects 1,000 cases of the disease.
Now let us compare two health policies, one preventive and one acute,
that are identical in terms of expected lives saved.
First, suppose that the risk of infection can be reduced to .00075 at a
cost of $25 per person. Suppose each individual values this reduction in
mortality risk at $X. If $X > $25, a cost-benefit analysis would consider
undertaking it.

49Fried, The Value of Human Life, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1969). The distinction
might
between identified and statistical lives might rest on two differences. It of a
refer to a difference between a certain loss of life and a (small) probability
loss of (the same) life. Or, it might refer to the difference between the (probable)
of
loss of the life of a specific individual and the same (probable) loss of the life
an unidentified person. Usually, these two differences are elided by comparing
the certain of loss of X's life to the .001 chance faced by each of 1000 individuals
(consequently with an identical expected loss of 1 life).
The first distinction challenges the linearity assumption discussed above. The
second distinction might be understood in terms of a compound lottery. Suppose
from a
X faces a .01 risk of death. Do individuals regard this risk differently
situation in which one of 1000 individuals will be chosen (in a fair lottery) to face
the .01 risk of death? (This hypothetical differs from the standard hypothetical
in
in at least two ways. First, it reduces the role that certainty of death plays
our intuitions. Second, in the standard hypothetical, many deaths might occur
because the risks to each individual are independent. In the compound lottery
example, at most one individual will die.)
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Alternatively, the population might spend $50,000 on each person who
falls ill; this treatment increases each person's chance of survival from
0 to .25. Suppose each infected person is willing to pay $1000Y for this
treatment; put differently, an insurance premium of $Y paid by each
person at risk would underwrite this treatment. If $Y > $50, a costbenefit analysis would see this project as desirable. If society had only
$25 million to spend, the criterion "maximize lives saved" recommends
adoption of the preventive policy which saves 250 lives (as opposed to
treating only half the infected population which saves only 125 lives).
The willingness-to-pay criterion, however, recommends the acute care
policy if $Y/$X > 4.50

Failure to maximize lives saved in this instance seems perverse because
ex ante, at time 0, everyone in the society prefers the policy of prevention.5 '
At time 1, however, 750 people will have fallen ill, and each of them
would prefer that the treatment were available. Put differently, suppose
the market for health care consisted of health maintenance organizations
(or other groups) that competed for clients on the basis of health package
and price. We can imagine a preventive care package that would provide
the preventive treatment at $25 per person 52 while another package offered the acute treatment at $50 per person. 53 Everyone it seems would
prefer to purchase the preventive care ex ante but ex post each would
desire the acute care.
50 Cost-benefit analysis recommends that the policy with the greatest ratio of
costs to benefits be adopted. The text assumes that each individual will value a
50-50 chance of acute treatment (conditional on infection) at $Y/2; this calculation
implicitly assumes linearity which the example otherwise denies. A more "realistic" example could be constructed.
5'The discussion in the text may not reveal with sufficient clarity the intricate
nature of the example. One can consult individual preferences for the two treatments at two distinct points in time: ex ante, that is, prior to exposure to the risk
of infection, or ex post, after identification of all infected parties. $X represents
for each individual the ex ante willingness-to-expend for the preventive care;
presumably, ex post, willingness-to-expend for preventive care will be 0. $1000Y
represents the ex post willingness-to-expend on acute care for each individual;
$Y, however, is not necessarily the ex ante willingness to expend on acute care.
The earlier discussion of non-linearity suggests that this ex ante willingness to
expend on acute care, say $Z, will be less than $Y. Can one conclude that Z X? By assumption, the acute and preventive care programs cause an identical
increase in survival prospects; ex ante, it seems that each individual should be
willing to pay an equal amount to implement each program. As the preventive
program can be implemented at lower cost, each individual should prefer preventive care because the money saved could be employed to reduce some other
risk (or to buy some small amount of acute care).
52 1 have thus implicitly amended the hypothetical by assuming that
the preventive treatment is a private good. Many public health measures may have an
aspect of public good to them as they reduce the risk of illness through improvement of water or air quality or by imposing more stringent safety standards on
universally distributed goods.
13 A third package might include both the preventive
and acute care elements
at a cost of $62.50 (the preventive care reduces the expected cost of acute care
from $50 to $37.50). 1 have assumed throughout that prices are set competitively
at actuarily fair levels.
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Several aspects of this hypothetical merit comment. First, and most
important, the bias for acute interventions results from the non-linearity
of preferences. It is therefore contingent on the preferences individuals
actually have. Let wi(p,b) be i's willingness to expend to reduce the background risk p by 8. The bias towards acute intervention follows from the
assumption that, for individual i, for each &, [p > p'] implies [wi(p,b) >
wi(p',&)]. Thus, for example, i would pay more to reduce her risk of death
from .99 to .98 than to reduce it from .02 to .01. If her preferences were
> wi(p',8)]), she would
reversed (so that for each 8 [p < p'] implied [wi(p,b)
54
interventions.
preventive
exhibit a bias toward
Second, as mentioned in footnote 51, ex ante willingness-to-expend may
differ from ex post willingness-to-expend. It may be that the non-linearity
which induces the bias arises because we compare the ex post willingnessto-pay for the acute program to the ex ante willingness-to-pay for the
preventive program. Such a comparison seems inappropriate in part because one might believe that an infected individual has, in some sense,
different preferences than she had when she faced only a risk of infection.
Certainly, personal injury that causes blindness or paraplegia radically
alters an individual's needs, wants, desires, and other components that
give rise to a preference ordering; we are thus inclined to think that the
injured individual has different preferences than the healthy individual.
This may also suggest that the imminence of death also alters the individual's preferences.
The occurrence of the infection introduces an additional problem, that
of precommitment. Suppose that society decides, on the basis of (linear)
ex ante willingnesses-to-pay to offer only the preventive care. Later, 750
individuals are infected. Society will be tempted to breach its commitment
to preventive care only at this point because medical resources could, at
this point, be allocated to these individuals and it will be difficult simply
to watch these individuals die. To the extent that wealth is unequally
distributed, society will find it more difficult to adhere to its commitment.
The wealthy after all will purchase, either legally or illegally, the acute
treatment; claims of equality will therefore urge that it be made available
to the poor victims as well as the wealthy.
6. What Aspect of the Distributionof Risk Matters?
Section 1.22 described preferences as governed by three factors: the
individual's wealth, the background risk to the individual, and the potential change in the individual's risk. Individual preferences, however,
might depend on other features of the policy or proposed change in risk.
Individuals for example might care about risks that threaten not only
them but also others within their family or community; parents, for instance, might choose to fly on separate aircraft to reduce the risk that
their children would lose both parents simultaneously. Alternatively, an
individual might care about the nature of the risk or the manner in which
- Actual preferences, of course, may exhibit more complex forms of non-linearity. An individual might, for example be willing to pay most to reduce her
background risk from .51 to .5, next to reduce it from .02 to .01 and least to reduce
it from .99 to .98.
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death threatens; that is, she might prefer, for example, death by water
to death by fire.
Self-interested individual preferences are unlikely to distinguish between risks that threaten many at once and risks that are independent.
Arguably, however, social policy might treat two such risks differently.55
Consider two cases: (A) Each person in a population of one million (106)
faces an independent .00001 (10 - 5) risk of death. The population thus
expects 10 deaths. (B) The entire population of 1,000,000 people faces a
10-11 risk of complete annihilation. Again the population "expects" 10
deaths. Ought these two risks be treated identically? Many individuals,
I think, consider risk (A) preferable to risk (B) even though the expected
number of deaths is identical. They care about the variance inherent in
the distribution of potential deaths.
7. Concluding Remarks.
Citizens and legal philosophers may legitimately demand of their government that it pursue a consistent social policy. In this essay, I have
outlined some difficulties in defining and achieving consistency in one
aspect of federal health and safety regulation: the "valuation" of life in
the regulation of risks of death. I have argued that the conundrum with
which I started, the variation among implicit values of life used by various
federal agencies, is easily resolved: the numbers cited are artifacts, without normative significance, of a consumer preference method for evaluating risks. Appropriate (and hence consistent) application of this method
requires that the policymaker consider the distribution of consumer preferences in the threatened population rather than consider some aggregate
statistic of those preferences.
The use of consumer preferences in the evaluation of social policy towards risk of death, however, presents several anomalies. I proposed a
simple, implementable change in methodology to correct for one of these,
a bias towards the lives of the rich over the lives of the poor; the policymaker should consider the consumer preferences conditioned on the
individual's having median wealth. This procedure, however, will not
eliminate the bias towards acute over preventive interventions, a bias
towards the aged over the young, nor a discrepancy with the policies
recommended by the mandate "maximize the number of lives saved."
These difficulties may, for many, present reasons against the propriety
of preference-based procedures to evaluate policies regulating risk. The
social dilemmas here, however, probably inhere in the problem rather
than the procedure. One can trace the consequences and conundrums of
preference-based procedures because they are well-specified and clear.
Not surprisingly, then, they fare poorly against some vague alternative
that, at least in our imagination, ideally resolves the myriad and complex
decisions that policymakers face daily. The social desirability of preference-based measures will be understood only after the analysis of equally
well-specified alternatives.
One ground for such a distinction might be the "moral preferences" of the
individuals. In social choice theory, for example, theorists generally impute to
each individual an ordering over social states; that ordering need not conform to
the individual's personal preferences, those which "dictate" her personal choices.
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